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A decision maker with time consistent preferences may exhibit diminishing
impatience, when uncertain lifetime is accounted for. Uncertain lifetime cap-
tures not only the risk of mortality, but also the possibility that a promise
for a delayed reward might be breached, or a postponed consumption might
not be realized. The restrictions that time consistency imposes on additive
intertemporal preferences are characterized. It is shown that if the hazard
rate of mortality is diminishing, then a time consistent agent will exhibit
diminishing impatience. A demographic model that allows for unobservable
heterogeneity in frailty (risk of mortality) accommodates diminishing impa-
tience, even in the presence of stationarity and time consistency.
JEL Classi￿cation: D81, D91, J10, J64
Keywords: Intertemporal substitution, time consistency, uncertain life-
time, exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, frailty, duration mod-
els, expectancy.1 Introduction
Uncertain lifetime is a metaphor for situations in which a planned consump-
tion path might not materialize. One cause could be mortality, but other
reasons - like breach of promise or exogenous disappearance of future re-
ward, are possible too. This paper studies the e⁄ect of uncertain lifetime
on time discounting when intertemporal preferences are time additive and
satisfy the expected utility assumptions. The importance of uncertain life-
time in temporal choice problems has been acknowledged since Rae ([24],
1834), and has been incorporated into the analysis of optimal consumption
and saving problems since Yaari ([40], 1965). However, previous studies that
accounted for uncertain lifetime did not have the vast experimental evidence
documenting diminishing impatience, which is available today. The focus
of this paper is on the apparent tension between time consistency and this
evidence.
Following Yaari￿ s work [40], it has been well understood that when un-
certain lifetime is accounted for, the risk of mortality and time preference
enter symmetrically into the utility function (e.g. Blanchard [4]). An out-
side observer can only observe time discounting - that is, marginal rates of
intertemporal substitution. If uncertainty is present then time discounting
is composed of time preference, which stands for intertemporal substitution
under full certainty, and odds of realizing consumption.
Time consistency means that when an individual can re-optimize, she
does not have an incentive to deviate from her ex-ante plan. Strotz [35]
proved that in a deterministic model, time consistency is equivalent to con-
stant time preference. Many experimental studies have tested the descrip-
tive applicability of the time consistency assumption. The leading evidence
brought against it is diminishing impatience: people are more sensitive to a
given time delay in consumption, if it occurs earlier rather than later1. That
is, as two dates are moved uniformly further into the future, the willingness
to sacri￿ce later consumption for an earlier consumption diminishes. This
experimental evidence seems to be inconsistent with the functional restric-
1For a survey of experimental results and interpretation see Section 4.1 in Frederick
et al [8]. Constant time preference su⁄ers from many other anomalies (see Section 4.2 in
Frederick et al [8] for a survey), but the focus of this work is diminishing impatience, since
it led the mainstream literature to adopt speci￿c functional forms that can accommodate
this evidence. See also Ok and Masatlioglu￿ s [23] discussion of the other anomalies in
their Section 4.1 .
1tion that time consistency imposes on time preference, and has led many
researchers to argue that the intertemporal utility function exhibits decreas-
ing discount rates2. Although all of the experiments (I am aware of) were
conducted at a single point in time, there seems to be a belief that actual
preference reversal would be observed if the preferences were elicited again
after some time has passed. To support this view, anecdotal evidence of
demand for commitment devices is brought (e.g. footnote 14 in [8]).
This paper characterizes the restrictions that time consistency imposes on
additive preferences when lifetime is uncertain. It is shown that if the decision
maker is Bayesian, time consistency is equivalent to constant time preference,
and does not impose any restrictions on the mortality process. Hence, if
preferences are time additive and stationary, satisfy expected utility and time
consistency (hence time preference is constant), a decreasing hazard rate over
the disappearance of future reward (mortality) translates into diminishing
impatience. Casual observation may indicate that many scenarios (especially
interactive) satisfy this property: an agent may assign some positive risk
that a promise for a reward in a week will not be kept, but conditioning on
a promise for a reward in a year being kept, the probability that a promised
reward in 53 weeks will not be delivered is lower (and may be zero). This
explanation is consistent with the experimental ￿ndings of Benzion et al [3]
who found strong support to the hypothesis that delayed consequences have
an implicit risk value (Rotter [26], Mahrer [20], Mischel and Grusec [21]). It
asserts the individual may assign some positive subjective probability (based
on past experience) that a delayed reward will not be paid and a delayed
payment will not be collected.
However, within the context of lifetime, it is well known that the hazard
rate of mortality (after childhood) is increasing and not decreasing. The re-
minder of the paper is devoted to building a realistic demographic model that
may be consistent with diminishing impatience. The model analyzed follows
the demographic literature (Vaupel et al [38], Vaupel [37]) and incorporates
unobservable frailty (risk of mortality), and an increasing hazard rate of mor-
tality conditional on frailty . The result is driven by a learning argument:
an agent is born with a prior belief over her frailty. As time passes and the
individual survives, her conditional expected frailty decreases. If learning is
2This is why this experimental evidence has become to be known as ￿hyperbolic dis-
counting,￿ as opposed to exponential (or geometric) discounting - where the discount rate
is constant.
2su¢ cient to cancel the increase in the hazard due to aging, the subjective
mixture distribution exhibits decreasing hazard rate, and is consistent with
the empirical evidence on diminishing impatience.
Note that the above argument can be made even if the individual does
not consciously acknowledge the uncertainty of lifetime as motivating her
behaviour. The economic tradition of analyzing decision-theoretic problems
requires the environment to be described accurately and the choices to be
observed by the modeler. The preferences derived should be consistent with
both. Furthermore, even for short horizons, when the probability of actual
death is negligible, how can an individual be absolutely certain that a promise
for future reward will be kept? Lifetime uncertainty captures this aspect of
doubt, which leads to a conservative behaviour.
The goal of this work is to point out that the leading evidence used to
support hyperbolic discounting, could be consistent with other models, and
even with time consistent choice. However, it should be acknowledged that
in some cases, in order to get sharp predictions, strong assumptions (like
speci￿c functional forms) - that capture a speci￿c aspect of the decision
making process - are required.
The current paper is organized as follows. After a short survey of the
related literature, Section 2 shows that Strotz￿ s result generalizes to uncer-
tain lifetime. That is, the agent￿ s decisions are time consistent only if time
distance is discounted exponentially. Section 3 uncovers the relation between
diminishing impatience and the decreasing hazard rate property. Section 4
shows that if individual￿ s frailty is unknown ex-ante, demographic models
that include belief updating can accommodate decisions that exhibit dimin-
ishing impatience. Section 5 concludes. All technical proofs appear in the
Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
In an intriguing paper, Sozou [33] considered a situation where the only com-
ponent of time discounting is the risk of mortality (no pure time preference),
characterized by a constant hazard rate. He showed that if the decision
maker has a prior belief over her hazard rate of mortality, she will exhibit
diminishing impatience, but time consistent choice. Azfar [2] extended this
3framework by allowing exponential time preference3. These papers relate to
the demographic model presented in Section 4, and their technical aspects are
discussed in Section 4.2.1. The current paper complements this line of rea-
soning along two dimensions: theoretical - in characterizing time consistency
under uncertain lifetime and disentangling time preference from the risk the
prize might disappear or the agent might die4; and applied - in suggesting a
realistic demographic model that is consistent with diminishing impatience
and time consistent choice.
I am aware of ￿ve other works that try to explain diminishing impatience
without imposing speci￿c structure (hyperbolic) on time preference. Read
[25] argues that diminishing impatience is a result of subadditive discount-
ing and not diminishing time preferences. Subadditive discounting implies
that when the interval between two temporal payo⁄s is divided into subin-
tervals then the total discounting increases. He presents experiments that
are consistent with subadditive discounting, while rejecting the predictions
of hyperbolic discounting. Rubinstein [28] advocates a procedural approach
based on similarity relations (which was developed originally by Rubinstein
in the context of choice under risk [27]). According to this approach, when
a decision maker compares a consumption of x in time t to consumption of
x0 in t0 she ￿rst looks for dominance (more is preferred to less, and sooner
is preferred to later); if there is no dominance she looks for a dimension of
similarity: is x similar to x0 or is t similar to t0? If she views one of the dimen-
sions as similar, then her preferences are determined by the other dimension.
If the ￿rst two steps are not decisive, then a di⁄erent criterion is applied.
Rubinstein compared the performances of the procedural approach he pro-
posed and hyperbolic discounting in a series of experiments, and showed that
the former can explain some choice patterns that are inconsistent with hy-
perbolic discounting. In an important recent work, Ok and Masatlioglu [23]
provide a representation for preferences on the (certain) prize-time space that
relies on weakening of transitivity while maintaining separability between
disutility of time delay and utility of outcomes. Their representation encom-
passes, inter alia, exponential discounting (when stationarity and transitiv-
ity are imposed), hyperbolic discounting, Read￿ s [25] subadditive discounting
3Weitzman [39] uses a similar framework to analyze the e⁄ect of constant - but unknown
- discount rate. As noted by Azfar [2], this framework leads to time inconsistent choices.
4That is, after showing that time consistency is independent of the stochastic process
governing mortality, a realistic demographic model with an increasing hazard rate could
be analyzed.
4and Rubinstein￿ s [28] procedural similarity. Note that in their deterministic
framework , diminishing impatience could be accounted for only by relaxing
stationarity (hyperbolic discounting) or transitivity (procedural similarity
and subadditivity), while the current work maintains both. Furthermore,
diminishing impatience implies in their model(s) naive time inconsistency,
while here time consistency is maintained.
FernÆndez-Villaverde and Mukherji [9] present a model where preferences
are shocked in every period, but the agent learns about the shock in the
current period before consumption decisions are made. They show that in
this framework, di⁄erent agents (who receive di⁄erent shocks during the cur-
rent period) may take di⁄erent decisions when deciding between current con-
sumption and a near future consumption, but as the time horizon is shifted
to the future, the current di⁄erent shocks become irrelevant, and all agents
will make the same choice. Furthermore, they present experimental evidence
which shows that the demand for commitment devices is quite limited, con-
trary to what is conjectured by the literature that hypothesize that preference
reversal is a probable consequence of diminishing impatience. Dasgupta and
Maskin [7] rationalize hyperbolic discounting in an environment in which
payo⁄s may be realized early5. They show that the decision maker becomes
more impatient as the horizon is shortened since the likelihood of early real-
ization diminishes in time.
2 Time Consistency with Uncertain Realiza-
tion
The problem analyzed in this section is a ￿cake eating￿problem, similar to
the original problem analyzed by Strotz [35]. The added feature here is that
at any point in time the remaining wealth (cake) might disappear (or the
agent might die). The goal of this exercise is to characterize the discount
function under which the agent￿ s decisions will be time consistent: she will
not have an incentive to deviate in the future from her ex-ante plan.
5As an alternative to timing realization they consider waiting cost.
52.1 The Environment
Consider an allocation problem of an individual with an unknown lifetime.
As noted above, uncertain lifetime captures the notion that at any point
in time the unconsumed remaining stock might disappear. For simplicity I
abstract from all other uncertainties (e.g. income), which could be included
in the analysis (see Yaari [40]). The ex-ante optimal program at time 0;
and the optimal program conditional on living (the remaining stock has not
disappeared) at time t > 0 are characterized. The agent￿ s time of death (or
the stock￿ s time of disappearance) is denoted by T: Since she does not know
her time of death, T is a random variable with pdf ￿ (T) on [0;1). The






The hazard rate at s; which is the pdf of T conditional on the agent living





Integrating both sides of (2), shows that the hazard rate fully characterizes





Let ￿t (s) where t ￿ s denote the conditional pdf of T at s given the consumer





and let ￿t (s) be the probability the consumer will be alive at s conditional








The consumer has an endowment of K (0) which she would like to allocate
to consumption between 0 and T: Hence, the problem is to ￿nd the optimal
6consumption path. Assume no depreciation, so the law of motion of the state
variable K is given by:
dK (s)
ds
= ￿C (s) (6)
The consumer￿ s intertemporal utility function is additive separable and sta-
tionary, when her instantaneous utility function is increasing and concave.
She evaluates uncertain prospects using expected utility, and discounts fu-
ture consumption by the discount function ￿(￿), which is a function of the
time distance between the future and the present.
2.2 Optimization











ds = ￿C (s)
K (t) > 0 given
K (s) ￿ 0 and C (s) ￿ 0 8 s ￿ t
The standard optimality conditions are given by:
￿t (s)￿(s ￿ t)u
0 (C (s);s) = ￿(s) 8 s ￿ t (8)
d￿(s)
ds
= 0 =) ￿(s) = b ￿t
The ex-ante planning problem is characterized by substituting t = 0 into (7),
and the optimality conditions are:
￿(s)￿(s)u
0 (C (s);s) = b ￿0 8 s ￿ 0 (9)
That is, the expected discounted marginal utility is constant along the opti-
mal path.
72.3 Time Consistency
I follow Strotz [35] in characterizing the discount function for which the
consumer￿ s choices at time t will abide by her original plan. The agent is
naive time consistent, if she has no incentives to deviate ex-post from her
original plan, even when her original plan is naive in the sense that it does
not take into account potential disagreements between future and current
preferences over consumption paths. The di⁄erence from Strotz is that here
the consumer does not know her time of death (or when the remaining stock
- K (t) - will disappear), hence she might die (or the remaining stock might
disappear) before consuming all of K (0); a situation which is not ex-post
optimal.
Theorem 1 A Bayesian decision maker is naive time consistent if and only
if she discounts time exponentially, that is:
￿(t) = Ae
￿￿t for A > 0 and ￿ 2 <
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, Strotz￿ s [35] result survives uncertain lifetime. The intuition behind
the result is that although time preference (characterized by ￿(￿)) and sur-
vival probabilities (characterized by ￿(￿)) enter symmetrically into the util-
ity function, Bayesian updating of ￿(￿) implies that a time consistent agent
would need to have constant time preference. If the consumer is impatient,
then ￿(￿) is a non-increasing function, and hence ￿ ￿ 06. Note that time
consistency says nothing about the mortality (or disappearance of the re-
maining stock) process. In particular, it does not imply the constant hazard
rate property.
6Burness [5] generalized Strotz￿ s result, and showed that when the discount factor
may depend on both the planning date and the date of consumption, and not only on
the time distance between them, naive time consistency is equivalent to a multiplicative
exponential function of each argument. In this paper, I impose the restriction that the
discount function will be a function of the time distance only, and time a⁄ects impatience
through the conditional probability of mortality only (which is a function of the time
distance too.)
83 Diminishing Impatience
From now on assume the agent is time consistent, and therefore ￿(t) = Ae￿￿t:
When uncertainty concerning the realization of consumption exists, as in the
case of uncertain lifetime, the observed marginal rate at which an individual
is willing to substitute utility between two periods (Uzawa [36]) is composed
of pure time preferences and belief concerning survival. Following [8] we call
this marginal rate of substitution - time discounting. Hence, the marginal















Experiments have shown (for a recent survey of results see Frederick, Loewen-
stein and O￿ Donoghue [8]) that this function is decreasing in t. That is, the
rate at which an individual is willing to substitute utility in t for utility
in t + ￿ is a decreasing function of t. This is the diminishing impatience
phenomenon that is commonly described as ￿hyperbolic discounting.￿In the
presence of uncertain lifetime, time discounting (MRS) is composed of time
preference (e￿￿) and the inverse of the probability the agent will be alive







: If the agent is
time consistent (hence time preference is constant), the evolution of ￿(￿)
determines the path of time discounting.
Theorem 2 If the agent is time consistent then she exhibits diminishing
impatience (time discounting) if and only if the uncertainty about lifetime














= sign(r(t + ￿) ￿ r(t))
9It might be helpful to have a di⁄erent view of the previous result. According
to (10), the rate of change of time discounting at t; is given by: ￿ + r(t).
Hence, the rate at which current utility could be substituted for future utility
is increasing with a diminishing rate if and only if the hazard rate, r(t); is
decreasing.
Assume the agent is comparing a reward of 100 dollars today to a promised
reward of 110 dollars in a year. Although in the comparison itself there
is no explicit uncertainty, all real life decisions involve uncertainty. In the
simplest case (presented above), the consumer does not know whether she
will be alive in a year. There is some probability she might die beforehand,
and will not be able to enjoy the promised future reward. This captures
the notion that even if the decision maker lives a year, there is some risk
the reward will not be available. This reasoning might be motivated by the
common wisdom that further away in time is the promise, the lower is the
probability it will be ful￿lled. Thus, even if the probability of actual death
is negligible, the agent might think she is facing risk on the payment side.
The willingness to sacri￿ce later consumption for an earlier consumption
might change when the time horizon changes. In comparing 100 dollars in
ten years to 110 dollars in eleven years, the decision maker might make the
following argument: ￿Conditional on surviving ten years, the probability of
surviving an extra year is higher than the probability of surviving a year
from today.￿On the dual (disappearance) side: ￿Conditional on the promise
of 100 dollars in ten years being kept, the probability that the promise of 110
dollars in eleven years will be honoured is higher than the prior subjective
probability that 110 dollars will actually be paid in a year.￿This result may
be motivated from the matching technology we are faced with in everyday
life. For example, if I just met a new acquaintance, the probability I will
know her whereabouts in a week is lower than the probability I will know her
whereabouts in a year and a week, conditional on knowing her whereabouts
in a year.
The explanation that diminishing impatience is the result of a decreasing
hazard rate, is consistent with the experimental ￿ndings of Benzion et al
[3]. In their study they found strong experimental support for the Implicit
Risk Approach (Mischel and Grusec [21]). This hypothesis is part of Rot-
ter￿ s Social Learning Theory (1954, [26]). Rotter claimed that the potential
(i.e. utility) of a behaviour (e.g. choice of immediate or delayed reward) is a
10function of the expectancy (subjective probability) it will lead to a reinforcer
(outcome) and the subjective valuation (desirability) of the reinforcer. One
interpretation of this theory is that the agent will choose the action with the
highest subjective expected utility. This theory emphasizes that individual￿ s
choices and preferences (personality) represent the interaction of the person
with her environment. Life experience builds up a certain set of subjective
beliefs, used in the evaluation of alternative actions. This point of view is
closely related to the one which motivated Gilboa and Schmeidler￿ s [10] study
of Cased Based Decision Theory. When life experience changes, the evalu-
ation of behaviour can change. As the agent accumulates life experience,
the harder (but not impossible) it becomes to adjust it. In particular, the
subjective probability (which is based on experience) could be di⁄erent from
the objective probability a consequence will occur. In the context of imme-
diate versus delayed rewards, a person may assign a subjective probability
(based on experience) that a promise for a delayed reward will not be kept.
Support for this interpretation can be found in Mahrer [20], who showed that
strengthening children￿ s trust in the promise maker increases the frequency
of them choosing delayed rewards over immediate rewards.
To be more concrete, consider the following example of extreme decreasing
hazard. Suppose there are two ￿types￿of promises for future reward: those
that are kept, and those that are not kept. The prior probability of the latter
type is r > 0. The di⁄erence in the subject￿ s evaluation of a certain present
(time 0) reward and a higher reward in near future (time ￿), is composed
of the implicit risk (r) and time preference (￿￿). However, when the dates
are moved uniformly into the future (to t and t+￿ respectively), they incur
the same risk and therefore their evaluation di⁄ers only as a result of the
time preference (￿￿). In spite of the fact that the agent exhibits diminishing
impatience, her decision will be time consistent: her preferences at t between
rewards at t and t + ￿ will conform to her preferences at time 0. The agent
will make the following argument:
￿Since the reward has been o⁄ered (at t), I should update my
belief over the type of promise made, in a way that will re￿ ect
the fact that the promise has been kept. Hence, my posterior
belief that the promised reward will not be delivered at t + ￿
is updated down to 0; and the di⁄erence in the evaluation of a
reward at time t and a reward at t + ￿ depends only on my time
preference - ￿￿.￿
11One might argue that individuals have adapted to this environment, and
in their answers to experiments cannot abandon this rule of thumb. Even
when the intertemporal decision problem is formulated in terms of certainty,
the decision maker frames it as one involving risk. This reasoning relies on
some inertia which is present in the decision maker￿ s decision process: she
cannot adjust her hard-wired decision rule to the environment presented at
the experiment.
4 Demographic Model of Uncertain Lifetime
As shown in the previous section, Bayesian time consistent individuals are
more sensitive to a given time delay if it occurs earlier rather than later, if and
only if the hazard rate of mortality is decreasing. However, it has been long
suggested (at least since Gompertz, 1825 [11]) that for an individual above
age 14, the hazard rate of death is increasing in age. These demographic
models are based on an assumption of a homogeneous population. Following
the demographic literature (Vaupel et al [38], Vaupel [37]), I argue here
that if individuals di⁄er in their frailty (force of mortality), and when born
have a prior subjective belief over the frailty component of their hazard rate,
allowing Bayesian updating of this prior may lead to a behaviour consistent
with a (subjective) decreasing hazard rate, although the actual hazard rate
(conditional on the true frailty) may be increasing.
Let (T;￿) be a bivariate random variable. Frailty is represented by the
non-negative random variable - ￿, which represents the consumer￿ s endow-
ment of longevity. The individual holds a prior belief over the distribution of
￿; denoted by the absolutely continuous cdf F and the pdf f: Conditional on
￿ = ￿; the pdf of T is given by ￿ (sj￿) and the probability that the individual
will be alive at time s is given by ￿(sj￿) =
R 1
s ￿ (tj￿)dt. Thus lifetime has




The following Proposition, shows that Strotz￿ s result survives this extended
model of unknown frailty:
Proposition 3 Let (T;￿) be a bivariate random variable denoting time of
death and endowment of frailty, respectively. Denote by F (￿) the absolutely
12continuous cdf of the prior belief over ￿; and by ￿ (￿j￿) the conditional pdf
of T given ￿ = ￿: If the consumer is Bayesian, then her decisions are naive
time consistent if and only if she discounts time exponentially, that is:
￿(t) = Ae
￿￿t for ￿ 2 < and A > 0
Proof. See Appendix.
As before, ￿ > 0 represents impatience.
I follow the demographic literature (that follows Cox [6]) and assume the
hazard rate is multiplicatively dependent on the frailty ￿:
r(t;￿) = ￿￿(t) (12)
where ￿(t) is the component of the hazard rate which is time dependent. In
what follows, I will construct an example that assumes a reasonable prior be-
lief over frailty and an increasing hazard rate conditional on frailty. Those de-
￿ne a well-behaved mixture distribution. Conditions for a decreasing hazard
rate for the mixture distribution will be derived, and according to Theorem
2 they imply diminishing impatience.
4.1 A Gamma Prior Belief over Frailty
I follow Vaupel, Manton and Stallard [38] and assume frailty at birth is






￿￿￿ for ￿ > 0 (13)
where ￿ and k are parameters of the distribution, such that E (￿) = ￿ ￿ = k
￿ and
V ar(￿) = k
￿2: This distribution is chosen because of its analytical tractability
and ￿ exibility. The following proposition characterizes the evolution of the
conditional frailty, independently of the distribution of the conditional hazard
rate.
7Weitzman [39] uses the gamma distribution to capture the distribution of the discount
factor in the population.
13Proposition 4 If the prior belief over frailty has a gamma distribution then
the posterior frailty conditional on surviving t is:
￿jfT ￿ tg ￿ Gamma(k;￿ (t))




The consumer is born and does not know her true frailty. She only has a prior
belief over it8. As she ages, she learns about her true frailty in the following
way: if she had been frail (high ￿), the probability of a short lifetime would
be high. Therefore, as t increases, the probability that she has a low frailty
increases, as summarized by the expected value of the conditional distribution
of frailty, which is equal to k
￿(t):
4.2 Gompertz￿ s (increasing) Conditional Hazard
Gompertz (1825, [11]) was the ￿rst who recognized that a hazard rate which
is an exponential function of age, captures the behaviour of human mortality
in a substantial portion of the empirical life table. Most of the mortality
models used today are adaptations of this observation to deviations from the
original Gompertz model at certain age intervals (e.g. old age.) Assume that
the time-dependent component of the hazard rate follows Gompertz￿ s [11]
rule:
￿(t) = e
bt where b ￿ 0 (14)
That is, conditional on frailty, the hazard rate is increasing exponentially.
The following proposition shows that even now, if b￿ < 1; the subjective
mixture distribution has a decreasing hazard rate and the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution is diminishing in time.
Proposition 5 Assume that conditional on the frailty value, the hazard rate
of death follows Gompertz￿ s law and the prior belief over frailty is gamma(k;￿).
If ￿b < 1; then a consumer with time-consistent preferences exhibits dimin-
ishing impatience.
8Vaupel [37] analyzes the cross generational correlation in lifespan when frailty is in-
herited.
14Proof. See Appendix.
To gain intuition of this result, normalize k to 1 (exponential prior). Then
the condition is b < 1
￿ = ￿ ￿(0): Thus, the individual believes ex-ante that her
frailty is higher than the rate of change of the hazard rate. Then, as time
progresses and she survives, she will update her subjective frailty su¢ ciently
to cause the subjective hazard rate (of the mixture distribution) to decrease.
4.2.1 A Constant Hazard and Related Literature
Although a model that assumes a constant hazard rate cannot be supported
empirically, it sheds light on the evolution of conditional frailty, and could
be applied easily. Assume frailty is the only component of the hazard rate.
That is, the hazard would be independent of age (constant hazard rate) and
normalized to 1. Then, according to Proposition 4 the conditional distribu-
tion of frailty would be gamma(k;￿ + t). It is easy to show that in this case:















which clearly is a decreasing function of t (since ￿b = 0) and has the explicit
hyperbolic structure suggested in the Psychological literature.
As noted in the Introduction, Sozou [33] presents examples where there
is no time preference (time neutrality), utility is the identity function and
the hazard rate is constant but unknown to an animal. He shows that the
updated hazard is decreasing in time9. Azfar [2] discusses a case of unknown
constant hazard, and shows that the apparent discount rate is diminishing,
but decisions are time consistent. The results in this paper show that the
conditional hazard could be increasing, as long as the subjective mixture
distribution of lifetime has the decreasing hazard rate property. Furthermore,
Proposition 3 shows that as long as time discounting is exponential, time
9Sozou and Seymour [34] study the evolution of time discounting allowing for ageing
(diminishing fertility) and unknown constant hazard, and ￿nd that time discounting will
diminish and then increase as the animal ages.
15consistency will prevail and is independent of the evolution of the hazard
rate.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has suggested an interpretation that when an agent is time con-
sistent, diminishing impatience may be related to the subjective diminishing
hazard rate of discontinuance of future consumption. Beyond casual obser-
vation and support from psychological theoretical and experimental studies
that justify this relation, it has been demonstrated that diminishing time
discounting may be supported by realistic demographic models. The latter
allow for unobservable heterogeneity in frailty, about which the agent learns
as time passes. Developments of inference methods from surveys of expected
longevity, as studied in Hamermesh [12], Smith, Taylor and Sloan [32], Hurd
et al [15], and Hurd and McGarry [16] seem to support at least part of the
empirical implications of the model presented here. For example, Hamermesh
[12], Hurd et al [15] and Hurd and McGarry [16] ￿nd (in di⁄erent surveys)
that individuals estimate their probability of survival to a target age quite
accurately, but overestimate the conditional probability of surviving to even
an older target age given survival to the ￿rst target - compared to an av-
erage timetable statistics. This ￿nding may be explained by an extensive
subjective updating of frailty during those critical years.
It is of interest that a line of reasoning similar to the one explored in
the demographic model, has been applied extensively in the labour litera-
ture to study duration models. This literature investigates how duration of
unemployment data (usually aggregate) could be disaggregated. It has been
observed that aggregate data on duration of unemployment exhibit a de-
creasing escape (hazard) rate from the unemployment state, while many job
search theories predict a constant or an increasing escape rates. Salant [29]
and Lancaster [19]10 argued that this could be due to heterogeneity of the
population: di⁄erent unemployed are endowed with a di⁄erent escape rate
parameter, and conditional on this parameter - their escape rate is actually
increasing. When the data is being aggregated, those with the high escape
rate leave the unemployment pool ￿rst, causing the aggregate (average) es-
cape rate to decrease. Identi￿cation techniques for such mixed processes have
been developed by Heckman [13] and Heckman and Singer [14].
10The ￿rst use of such an argument in employment data is by Silcock [30].
16The goal of this work was to point out that empirical evidence of dimin-
ishing impatience could be consistent with models di⁄erent from hyperbolic
discounting - and even with time consistent choice. Hence, further research
(experimental and theoretical) is required in order to identify and under-
stand humans￿decision making over time. In some applications, however,
the need to provide sharp predictions, or the desire to focus on a single as-
pect of behaviour (like possible preference reversals), justi￿es the usage of
strong assumptions (like speci￿c functional forms). Works of Laibson [18],
Laibson and Harris [17] and O￿ Donoghue and Rabin [22] are just few leading
examples of this methodology. The coexistence and tolerance between these
two methods of research is crucial to further advance our understanding and
modeling of intertemporal preference.
A Proofs
Theorem 1 A Bayesian decision maker is naive time consistent if and only
if she discounts time exponentially, that is:
￿(t) = Ae
￿￿t for A > 0 and ￿ 2 <
Proof. The consumption at time s as planned at t should be equal to the


























￿(t) and ￿ := s￿t; this is a functional equation in ￿(￿) 11 :
￿(t + ￿) = a(t)￿(￿)
11A similar mathematical method has been used by Smith [31] in studying optimal
stopping.
17Taking logarithm and setting f (￿) := ln(￿(￿)) and h(￿) := ln(a(t)); one
gets:
f (t + ￿) ￿ f (￿) = h(t)
Setting ￿ = 0: h(t) = f (t) ￿ f (0) hence:
f (t + ￿) ￿ f (￿) = f (t) ￿ f (0): Letting ￿ := ￿f (0) :
f (t + ￿) ￿ f (￿) ￿ f (t) = ￿ or by adding and subtracting ￿ from the lhs:
[f (t + ￿) + ￿] ￿ [f (￿) + ￿] ￿ [f (t) + ￿] = 0
Let ’(￿) = f (￿) + ￿. The following functional equation:
’(￿ + ￿) = ’(￿) + ’(t) for all t;￿ ￿ 0 (18)
is Cauchy￿ s basic equation, which, if ’(￿) is continuous at a point, is uniquely
solved by:
’(t) = ct 8t ￿ 0
(Aczl [1]). It is immediate from (18) that ’(0) = 0: Hence ￿(t) = ef (t) =
e’ (t) ￿ ￿ = ect + ln(￿(0)) = ￿(0)ect, letting A = ￿(0) :
￿(t) = Ae
ct
Letting ￿ = ￿c the theorem is proved.
Proposition 3 Let (T;￿) be a bivariate random variable denoting time of
death and endowment of frailty, respectively. Denote by F (￿) the ab-
solutely continuous cdf of the prior belief over ￿; and by ￿ (￿j￿) the
conditional pdf of T given ￿ = ￿: If the consumer is Bayesian then
her decisions are naive time consistent if and only if she discounts time
exponentially, that is:
￿(t) = Ae
￿￿t for ￿ 2 < and A > 0
18Proof. This problem has a similar structure to the one studied in Theorem
1. The updated pdf of ￿ conditional on surviving to t is given by:
ft (￿) = f (￿jT ￿ t) =
f (￿)￿(tj￿)
￿(t)
Hence, the updated survival function:
￿t (s) = PrfT ￿ sjT ￿ tg =
Z












Therefore, the functional equation (17) may be reduced similarly to Cauchy￿ s
basic functional equation.
Proposition 4 If the prior belief over frailty has a gamma distribution, then
the posterior frailty conditional on surviving t is:
￿jfT ￿ tg ￿ Gamma(k;￿ (t))
where ￿ (t) = ￿ +
R t
0 ￿(s)ds




0 r(t;￿)dt = e
￿
R s
0 ￿￿(t)dt = e
￿￿
R s









f (￿jT ￿ t) =









































































The distribution of frailty conditional on surviving to age t is gamma(k;￿ (t))
Proposition 5 Assume that conditional on the frailty value, the hazard rate
of death follows Gompertz￿ s law and the prior belief over frailty is
gamma(k;￿). If ￿b < 1; then a consumer with time-consistent prefer-
ences exhibits diminishing impatience.















Let ￿ r(t) denote the expected value of the hazard rate conditional on living
at least t, and let ￿ ￿(t) be the expected value of frailty conditional on living
at least t. Then:
￿ r(t) = ￿(t) ￿ ￿(t) = e
bt k




b [ebt ￿ 1]
20It is easy to see that
d￿ r(t)
dt < 0 if and only if b￿ < 1: Hence, the mixture
distribution possesses a diminishing hazard rate and Proposition 2 applies.
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